Nuclear Power Plant Licensing - Jurisdiction to Consider Foreign Impacts by Silver, Melinda
Volume 23 
Issue 1 Winter 1983 
Winter 1983 
Nuclear Power Plant Licensing - Jurisdiction to Consider Foreign 
Impacts 
Melinda Silver 
Recommended Citation 
Melinda Silver, Nuclear Power Plant Licensing - Jurisdiction to Consider Foreign Impacts, 23 Nat. 
Resources J. 225 (1983). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol23/iss1/17 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more 
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu. 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING-
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER FOREIGN IMPACTS
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that exportation of a nuclear power plant and nuclear matter to the
Philippines, an exclusively foreign jurisdiction, is not inimical to the
common defense and security of the United States or to the health
and safety of the public and that no environmental impact statement
(EIS) is required. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 1974, the Philippine government, acting through its wholly-
owned National Power Corporation, began procedures to buy a nuclear
power plant from Westinghouse Electric Corporation (hereafter "West-
inghouse").' The 620 megawatt plant would be constructed at Napon
Point, on the island of Luzon in the Philippines. Napon Point is about
twelve miles from the Subic Bay Naval Base and forty miles from Clark
Air Force Base where a total of 32,000 armed American service members
are stationed. The area is seismically active.
In January 1976, the Export-Import Bank of the United States author-
ized $600 million in loans and loan guarantees to finance the proposed
Philippine nuclear power plant. Pursuant to Section 1032 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, 3 Westinghouse filed with the NRC an export appli-
cation for the reactor.4
1. In 1968 the Philippines and the United States negotiated a treaty establishing a general frame-
work for nuclear sales to the Philippines. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1351 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133-2134 (1976, & Supp. IV 1980). The Atomic Energy Act (the Act) of 1954
was amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).
The NNPA sets out a regulatory scheme, Act of Mar. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat.
120 (codified in scattered sections of 22 & 42 U.S.C.). The NRC must forward export applications
to the Department of State, which triggers review by the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce,
and Energy, as well as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The executive branch then
recommends to the NRC whether or not the license should issue. 42 U.S.C. § 2155 (Supp. 11 1978).
The Commission then must act within*60 days, or inform applicant of the reasons for delay, and
provide follow-up reports. If the NRC has not issued an export license within another 60 days, the
President may withdraw the application from the NRC, and may authorize the export by executive
order.
Within 60 days of a presidential decision, Congress may block a nuclear export authorized by the
President. Congress, however, has no power to block an NRC authorization. The Commission also
has authority to order public proceedings, which gives the NRC a 60 day extension after the
termination of the proceedings.
3. Id.
4. The NRC "is authorized to issue licenses to persons applying therefor to ... export under
the terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 23 (42 U.S.C. § 2153),
utilization or production facilities for industrial or commercial purposes." 42 U.S.C. § 2133(a) (1976).
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On December 12, 1977 the State Department recommended approval
of the application. A month later, however, the State Department asked
the NRC to defer action on the Westinghouse application while the de-
partment studied the impact of the proposed power plant on American
troops stationed at the naval bases and the problems of locating the plant
in a seismically active area.
The Philippines had no experience owning or operating a nuclear power
plant.' Its government, however, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, must place all nuclear facilities in the
Philippines under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-
guards. 6 The IAEA's principal objective is to accelerate and enlarge the
peaceful contribution of atomic energy throughout the world.7 In accord-
ance with the treaty, the Philippines sought help from the IAEA, and
requested an IAEA Safety Mission, on two separate occasions, to review
safety aspects of the proposed nuclear reactor site.' Additionally, the
Philippines sought outside expertise from a United States firm in selecting
the site. Further, the Philippines has its own regulatory commission,
similar to the NRC, called the "Puno Commission," which works in
cooperation with the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and
with the IAEA.9
These combined governmental efforts indicated the Philippines' ability
to comply with international law. Under international law, the recipient
nation is responsible for the health and safety of all individuals living in
its territories.' ° The Philippine government, therefore, appeared to be
responsible for health and safety impacts from the nuclear power plant
upon all residents of their country, including the American service mem-
bers.
The Philippines allayed the State Department's concerns, and on Sep-
tember 28, 1979, the executive branch recommended issuance of the
license for the proposed reactor's component parts. At the same time the
executive branch submitted to the NRC a "Concise Environmental Re-
view" discussing siting and environmental considerations and the Phil-
ippines nuclear regulatory process. The NRC next held public hearings
5. 647 F.2d at 1369 n. 6.
6. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 11 N.R.C. 631, 653 n. 52 (1980).
7. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. NO. 6477, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY (1957).
8. 11 N.R.C. at 655 n. 61. An IAEA Safety Mission visited the Philippines in May, 1978, and
presented a report to the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in July, 1978.
9. Id. The Puno Commission conducted several weeks of public hearings, receiving testimony
from 64 witnesses. These witnesses included two well known seismic experts.
10. Responsibility for nuclear damage is specifically placed on the operator of a nuclear instal-
lation. International Conventions of Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, IAEA,
Legal Series No. 2 (Vienna 1964).
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to solicit comments on possible effects to "global commons, United States
territory, and the common defense and security of the United States."I
Seven months later, on May 6, 1980, the NRC issued two orders
authorizing Westinghouse to export to the Philippines a nuclear reactor
and complementary nuclear materials. The Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and other public interest groups petitioned the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals to order temporary suspension of materials
shipments. On December 10, 1980, the court denied the motion.
In a subsequent proceeding, the NRDC challenged the NRC decision
not to prepare an EIS before granting export licenses to Westinghouse.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission,'2 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the NRC's
May 6, 1980 orders.
BACKGROUND
The issues in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission arise from two national acts, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA)' 3 and the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1969 (NEPA),'a and the respective obligations these acts impose
upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Implicit in the con-
troversy are questions of NRC jurisdiction and political ramifications of
imposing an environmental impact statement (EIS) requirement on a for-
eign country and of the particular ability of the Philippines to self-regulate
a nuclear power facility within its country.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Export Licensing
Procedures
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (the Act), as amended by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), contains licensing procedures for
exportation of nuclear power plants and complementary materials. The
Act requires the executive branch to review all export applications before
the NRC may issue an export license." Concurrently, under Section
103(d) of the Act, the Commission must determine that the proposed
reactor "would [not] be inimical to the common defense and security or
11. The Commission defined "U.S. territory" to mean the territory of the 50 states plus the trust
territories and possessions of the United States. 11 N.R.C. 631, 656 n. 63 (1980). "Global commons"
signified the high seas (further than 12 miles from territorial shores), Antarctica, and portions of the
atmosphere outside the sovereign jurisdiction of a single nation. Id. at 636 n. 15.
12. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13. Act of Mar. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (codified in scattered sections of
22 & 42 U.S.C.).
14. 42 U.S.C. §4321-4347 (1976).
15. See supra note 2.
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to the health and safety impacts of the public. "'6 Congress did not provide
definitions for the terms contained in Section 103(d). In light of the lack
of definitive guidelines, therefore, the NRC has had to examine prior
judicial decisions, the legislative history of the NNPA, and other pro-
visions of the Act in order to determine NRC duties.
Prior Judicial Decisions
Prior to this case, no United States court had decided the meaning of
the phrase "inimical to the common defense and security or to the health
and safety impacts of the public" as provided in Section 103(d). In the
four years preceding Westinghouse's applications to export nuclear ma-
terials and a nuclear reactor to the Philippines, however, the NRC had
addressed this question. The NRC consistently determined that Section
103(d) did not give the NRC authority to review health, safety and en-
vironmental impacts in foreign jurisdictions resulting from nuclear exports
to that jurisdiction.' 7
Legislative History of the NNPA
The NRC decisions, alluded to in footnote seventeen above, were made
prior to the enactment of NEPA. However, Congress was aware of these
decisions and noted them during floor debates before the NNPA was
passed.' 8 Thus, it is significant that when Congress amended the Act with
the NNPA, it did not admonish the NRC for not reviewing health, safety
and environmental impacts in foreign jurisdictions. By not requiring the
NRC to alter its procedures, Congress tacitly approved of the NRC's past
policy with respect to exports. Furthermore, Congress in other legislation
enacted health and safety review procedures for consumer product ex-
ports, such as children's clothing.' 9 This incorporation of explicit review
16. 42 U.S.C. §2133(d) (1976). In full, § 103(d) reads:
(d) No license under this section may be given to any person for activities which
are not under or within the jurisdiction of the United States, except for the export of
production or utilization facilities under terms of an agreement for cooperation arranged
pursuant to section 2153 of this title, or except under the provisions of section 2139
of this title. No license may be issued to an alien of any [sic] corporation or other
entity if the Commission knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or
dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government. In any event,
no license may be issued to any person within the United States if, in the opinion of
the Commission, the issuance of a license to such person would be inimical to the
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
17. Edlow International Co. (export of special nuclear material to India), 5 N.R.C. 1358 (1977);
Babcock & Wilcox (export of reactor components to West Germany), 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977);
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (export of reactor parts to Spain), 3 N.R.C. 739 (1976); Edlow Inter-
national (export of special nuclear material to India), 3 N.R.C. 563 (1976).
18. 11 N.R.C. at 639 n. 20.
19. E.g., Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. 11 1978); Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1273 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2067 (Supp. 11 1978).
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procedures into other legislation shows clearly that Congress does speak
in favor of review when it perceives the need to do so. Significantly,
Congress did not include within the NNPA a similar review for nuclear
exports.
Other Provisions of the NNPA
In 1978 Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act primarily to give
the NRC clear guidance on the criteria to be applied in its export licensing
determinations.2" Congress determined that "forbearance from nuclear
weapons capability depended on the satisfaction of (seemingly irrepres-
sible) world demand for nuclear generating capability." 2 By becoming
the world's routine and regular supplier of fuel for nuclear light water
reactors, the United States hoped to diminish the world-wide need for
technologies, such as conventional reprocessing, that lead quickly to
nuclear weapons capability.22 To enhance the United States' position as
a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel, Congress provided the NRC with a
streamlined procedure, and a less arduous and less time consuming li-
censing process, for considering export applications. Section 103(d),
therefore, has been interpreted in light of the NNPA's specific non-pro-
liferation criteria.
In 1977, while discussing procedures for amendment of the Atomic
Energy Act, the House Committee on International Relations issued a
report which stated that "in the absence of unusual circumstances, the
committee believes that any proposed export meeting the non-proliferation
safeguards criteria set forth in subsection 127a and . . . subsection 128a.
[sic], would also satisfy the common defense and security standard." ' 23
Subsections 127(a) and 128(a), therefore, could subsume the inimicality
requirement absent a finding by the NRC of "unusual circumstances."
However, the House Committee did not specify what constitutes an un-
usual circumstance, making it unclear whether or not the NRC had to
look beyond the non-proliferation safeguards to determine whether the
defense and security standard was met.
The NRC has never considered health and safety impacts to citizens
of the foreign nation which will receive nuclear materials, because NRC
"health and safety impacts on the public" had generally been interpreted
to mean impacts on the "American public." 24 Although Americans fre-
quently live in recipient nations, the health and safety interests of those
20. 11 N.R.C. at 639.
21. 647 F.2d at 1360.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 587, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
23. Id. at 21.
24. S. REP. NO. 467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977).
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Americans have not compelled the NRC to prepare full-scale environ-
mental reviews comparable to NRC domestic licensing proceedings.
Even if the NRC interpreted "public" to mean "American citizens
residing abroad," other provisions of the NNPA may inhibit NRC au-
thority to prepare an EIS. Section 2(d) of the NNPA stresses cooperation
with foreign nations in identifying and adopting suitable nuclear programs
"consistent with the economic and material resources of those nations
and environmental protection." ' 2 Pursuant to this policy, section 501 of
the Act requires the President to report annually to Congress on how this
section of the Act is being implemented.2 6 By stressing cooperation with
recipients rather than unilateral United States' review, these sections may
act as limits on NRC authority to interfere in foreign nuclear programs.
Finally, Congress set short time limits for processing nuclear export li-
censing applications. These limits were inconsistent with the estimated
two years needed for a full-scale environmental review. 27
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
NEPA requires
to the fullest extent possible .. .[that] all agencies of the Federal
Government ... include in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement
[an EIS] by the responsible official on ... the environmental impact
of the proposed action .... 28
This mandate arises from a federal policy "to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of
the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Na-
tion. .. "29 Legislative history does not reveal whether NEPA requires
the NRC to include an environmental impact statement with its recom-
mendations for nuclear exports to exclusively foreign jurisdictions. NE-
PA's stated purpose, other provisions of NEPA, and judicial precedents
are not dispositive of the issue.
Congress appeared to be addressing only Americans when it stated in
NEPA its desire to enrich the understanding of the natural resources
important to "the Nation." 30 In the same paragraph, however, Congress
voices its concerns for the "biosphere" and for the "welfare of man,"
which may be interpreted as international problems.3' Further, NEPA
25. 22 U.S.C. §3201(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
26. 22 U.S.C. §3261 (Supp. IV 1980).
27. See supra note 2, 647 F.2d at 1366, 1386.
28. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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requires federal agencies to "maximize international cooperation" to pre-
vent deterioration of the world-wide environment.32 Federal courts re-
solved the few pertinent cases without determining whether Congress
intended to apply NEPA extraterritorially.
33
Effects of Imposing an EIS on a Foreign Country
If the NRC must prepare an EIS for nuclear exports to foreign countries,
NRC's jurisdiction would be extended beyond a traditional reading of
United States statutory law. Statutory law applies only to conduct oc-
curring within, or having effects within, the territory of the United States,
unless the contrary is clearly indicated in the statute.34 Supreme Court
decisions base this approach on the assumption that Congress is primarily
concerned with, and capable of dealing with, domestic conditions. 5 Fur-
ther, the President has the last word on nuclear exports and on the conduct
of foreign relations between the United States and other countries.36 Fi-
nally, no state has "jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the
ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals." 37 Since NEPA does
not explicitly require application of the EIS requirement abroad, there is
a presumption that this requirement is applicable only within the territory
of the United States. To find otherwise runs contrary to the general rule
enunciated by the Supreme Court concerning United States' statutory law
as applied to its foreign relations.
If the EIS requirement applied to exports of nuclear materials to a
foreign jurisdiction, certain results might follow. To ensure that domestic
health and safety standards were met and maintained, the United States,
through the NRC, would likely proscribe activity in the foreign jurisdic-
tion. Such action might be considered as United States' interference, and
might result in (a) hampered activities between the United States and the
foreign nations; (b) added costs to recipient nations; (c) intrusion into
matters that should be protected for security reasons; and, ultimately, (d)
decreased likelihood that the United States would attain its security and
nuclear non-proliferation goals."
32. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(F) (1976).
33. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 392 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the court assumes NEPA
application to federal construction in Panama; but left "resolution of this important issue to another
day"); National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United States Dep't. of State, 452
F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D.C. 1978).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 38 (1965).
35. Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2155 (Supp. 11 1978); 647 F.2d at 1364.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 30.2 (1965).
38. 647 F.2d at 1357 N. 52; see Almond, The Extraterritorial Reach of United States Regulatory
Authority Over the Environmental Impacts of Its Activities, 44 ALB. L. REV. 739 (1980).
January 19831
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia determined whether the NRC had authority to issue a nuclear
export license without first preparing an EIS when the export was destined
for a country nonadjacent to the United States. The court agreed with the
NRC that (1) the NRC had no jurisdiction to apply NEPA's mandates to
the Philippines; (2) the existence of 32,000 Americans in the Philippines
does not require the NRC to produce an EIS of a nearby nuclear reactor
site; (3) the NRC could defer to the executive branch's determinations
on whether an application for a nuclear export license was "non-inimical
to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the
public"; (4) the NRC could rely on generally available literature and
analytical models in lieu of an EIS in finding that issuance of an export
license would not be inimical to the "global commons"; and (5) the
Philippine government has responsibility for regulating its nuclear power
plant, so that the NRC should not impose its regulatory opinions on this
foreign government.
The-court of appeals also agreed with the NRC's reasoning in support
of the above conclusions. The court agreed that United States' law man-
dates that federal statutes apply only to conduct within, or having effect
within, the territory of the United States, unless the particular statute
clearly indicates it is to apply extraterritorially. By applying this concept
to the NNPA and NEPA, the court concluded that the NRC has no ob-
ligation to evaluate foreign impacts to find "noninimicality." Further,
although the NRC has discretion to consider these impacts and possible
effects on U.S. foreign interests and citizens, the NRC is under no ob-
ligation to consider those interests. Finally, the court concluded that NEPA
imposes no requirement that the NRC prepare an EIS for nuclear exports
which will exclusively affect foreign jurisdictions.
The court was faced with a controversy between two groups. The
NRDC and others argued that the NRC must not be allowed to issue
nuclear export licenses without first considering whether the foreign ac-
tivity would be inimical to the United States' "common defense and
security," and that the NRC should be required to prepare an EIS before
issuing the export licenses. The NRC, in turn, argued that it could defer
to the executive branch in its determinations of "non-inimicality to com-
mon defense and security," and restrict its own jurisdiction to determi-
nations of "non-inimicality to the 'global commons."' Further, NRC
argued that NEPA's mandates did not extend to foreign jurisdictions,
because overriding foreign policy considerations, as stated in NNPA,
[Vol. 23
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encourage the United States to expedite the exportation of nuclear ma-
terials.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that the
issues before the court were questions of law: interpreting statutory terms
like "common defense and security" and "health and safety" of the
public, and interpreting the jurisdictional reach of NEPA.
After an extensive examination of the legislative history of NNPA, the
court concluded that the entire thrust of the legislation was to standardize
and expedite the nuclear licensing process, especially for materials in-
tended for shipment to foreign countries. The court accepted the NRC's
finding of no "unusual circumstances," even though Americans were
stationed near the planned nuclear site and the area was seismically active.
Since the objective of the NNPA was to see "opportunities for proliferation
quashed," 39 the court found such objective was best met by cooperation
and by limiting the NRC's role to that of expediting nuclear export
licensing procedures, as it had limited its own role in the past.4" The
NNPA scheme, therefore, requires that the United States stress its reli-
ability as a supplier of nuclear material over any desire to exercise control
over its use. 4 The hope of the NNPA is that the United States' "hands-
off" attitude will encourage non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.42
The court's reluctance to find that NEPA applies to NRC nuclear export
licensing decisions is based on the same anti-extraterritorial policy ar-
guments.43 The non-proliferation and foreign policy objectives of NNPA
override the goals of NEPA, which serves a wholly domestic context. As
the court stated, "[f]or international nuclear transactions, it appears to be
the will of Congress that bilateral or multilateral cooperation respecting
the environment take precedence over unilateral American efforts." 44
Therefore, even though NEPA contains language concerning the "bios-
phere" and the "welfare of man," the court of appeals concentrated on
the likely spectre of litigation over the adequacy of the EIS and on how
such delay would frustrate the United States' foreign relation objectives. 45
By deciding this controversy, the court shaped a clearer role for the
United States in the international community. At issue was whether the
United States would freely provide nuclear materials to friendly foreign
nations unhampered by the U.S. domestic regulatory scheme. The court
decided that the NRC could defer to the executive with respect to "non-
inimicality" findings and that the NRC was under no obligation to prepare
39. 647 F2d at 1361.
40. Id. at 1362.
41. Id. at 1365.
42. Id. at 1364.
43. Id. at 1366.
44. Id. at 1348.
45. Id. at 1366.
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an EIS for the nuclear plant in the Philippines. It clearly decided that,
absent "unusual circumstances," furtherance of non-proliferation goals
complied with Section 103(d)'s non-inimicality requirements. Notably,
environmental concerns and concerns about the ability of foreign countries
to regulate their industries were of secondary importance.
ANALYSIS
Positive Aspects of this Decision
The decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission helps the United States to achieve its nuclear
non-proliferation goals by streamlining U.S. export procedures and mak-
ing U.S. nuclear exports more competitive on the international market.
Further, this court approved an NRC decision to defer to the executive
branch. To the extent that the President and his cabinet are more fully
informed of foreign affairs than the NRC, such deference may be desir-
able. Ultimately, the President is responsible for United States' foreign
policy decisions. 46
The decision of the court of appeals also comports with the interna-
tional community, as stated in The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment.47 The Declaration consistently proclaims that governments
should not transfer the burdens of the environmental policies of the in-
dustrialized countries to the developing countries. Instead it will be es-
sential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in each
country and their economic burdens. 4s Developing countries, like the
Philippines, will not be burdened by NEPA standards in their quests to
begin electrical generation by nuclear power.
Problems with this decision
Arguably, by freely selling nuclear materials to foreign countries, the
United States is increasing rather than decreasing the threat of nuclear
proliferation by increasing the availability of nuclear materials and tech-
nology. 49 Even if the threat of nuclear armament build-up may be lessened,
46. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
47. The Stockholm Declaration of the Human Environment, "Development & Environment," 67
STATE DEP'T BULL. 116 (1972).
48. Id.
49. J. McPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY (1976); M. WILLRICH, T. TAYLOR,
NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 170 (1974); E.g., in Edlow International Co.,
7 N.R.C. 436, 443-44 (1978), NRC Commissioners Victor Gilinsky and Peter Bradford voted
against approval of an export application to sell nuclear materials to India. They objected to the
sale, because they had not been fully assured that India would not reprocess the fuel or use it for
"peaceful" nuclear explosions at some future date. In spite of the NRC's stalemate, President Carter
approved the license and the House voted to reject a resolution that would have blocked the export.
Exec. Order No. 12,055, 3 C.F.R. 177 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2155 app. at 1484-85
(Supp. 111978); H.R. CONG. REC. 599, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 20, 520 (1978).
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there remain health and safety impacts of nuclear power plants. Newly-
trained personnel, in nations undergoing rapid development and changing
forms of government, lack the expertise and experience to fully evaluate
possible health and safety problems in their nuclear power plants. 0 If the
NNPA is a workable means to achieve nuclear non-proliferation, then
arguably the NRC should not lightly regard its role in that scheme,
whereby it is authorized "to provide a strong individual check" on the
judgment of the executive branch. 5 The NRC, however, chose to rely
on the State Department's determinations of reliability in the Philippines
rather than to make its evaluation by drawing on its own technical ex-
pertise. 2 As Justice Robinson noted in his concurrence, factors which
seemed to beg greater NRC technological involvement in determining
health and safety aspects included: (1) the Philippines' lack of experience
with nuclear energy; and (2) the site of the proposed plant in "the shadow
of four volcanoes in a known earthquake zone." 53 The decision is also
unsettling because the term "unusual circumstances" remains undefined.
It is difficult to understand why the exportation of a nuclear plant to a
country with no experience operating a plant of its own, on a seismically
active site, with 32,000 American servicemen nearby, does not create an
"unusual circumstance. "54
The goals of NNPA may not be met by such minimal NRC involvement,
because Congress enacted the NNPA not only to speed up the export
process but also to formulate a reliable procedure. Justice Robinson agreed
with NRC Commissoner Bradford that the NRC could have expanded its
reading of activities which might be inimical to "the common defense
and security of the United States." 55 "Nuclear licensing around the world
is clearly affected by a major accident." 56 If the United States exports a
faulty plant or a design which it would not allow to be licensed do-
mestically, any future accident at that plant is likely to be attributed, in
part, to the negligence and carelessness of the U.S. export business.57
International critics may not separate problems originating at the site from
the quality of the exported product, so the safety of the plant in a particular
location is a concern which demands NRC site specific review. A major
nuclear accident could ruin the reputation of the United States as an
exporter of nuclear material and equipment. This in turn would defeat
50. 647 F.2d at 1380 n. 94 (Robinson, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1378 n. 83 (Robinson, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1370.
54. Id. at 1382; 11 N.R.C. 631, 666 (Comm'r Bradford dissenting).
55. 647 F.2d at 1381 n. 116 (Robinson, J., concurring).
56. 11 N.R.C. at 667 (Comm'r Bradford dissenting).
57. Id. at 644 (views of the public interest groups).
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the nation's non-proliferation goals announced in the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act.
Official foreign resentment of U.S. intervention may have caused the
NRC and the Court of Appeals to overlook the fact that many of the
petitioners asking for an EIS were Filipinos. The Philippine Movement
for Environmental Protection, among other Filipino public-interest groups,
petitioned the court for a review of the NRC May 6, 1980 decision.5
Moreover, as Justice Robinson indicated, the court may have put too
much emphasis on the precepts of international law, since "neither courts
nor agencies may adhere to international law if to do so would create
any conflict whatsoever with the positive statutory laws of this country. " 9
Allowing the NRC to exercise discretion on whether to thoroughly
review environmental impacts in foreign jurisdictions may set a precedent
which will lead to lessened NRC initiative and responsibility. As Justice
Robinson warned, in the future the NRC might become so lax as to rely
on outdated materials. Ultimately, the courts may find that the NRC
abused its discretion in relying on those materials. 6' Further, the NRC
may neglect to produce an EIS for a foreign site even when that foreign
country has not raised questions of intrusions to their sovereignty. 6'
The commission's deference to the executive branch makes such future
nonaction more probable than not. Congress specifically gave the NRC
the responsibility to issue licenses and to use its technical expertise in
reviewing nuclear export applications. 62 By deferring to the executive
branch, however, it appears tha the NRC is abandoning its technical
considerations to the executive's political considerations. As Judge Ro-
binson criticized, "the NRC should adhere to executive judgments on
international relations, but not on technological subjects .. "63 The
NRC thereby risks issuing licenses which are politically and economically
advantageous to the United States, but which are possibly creating un-
reviewable health and safety risks abroad.
CONCLUSION
Although this decision appears to be adverse to environmentalists
worldwide, it need not be precedent for abandoning health and safety
reviews of United States' nuclear exports. In the instant case the Phil-
ippines cooperated closely with IAEA, which is staffed, in part, by NRC
58. 647 F.2d at 1378 (Robinson, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 1377 (Robinson, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 1388 (Robinson, J., concurring).
61. In the instant case, petitioners included some Philippine nationals, including the Philippine
Movement for Environmental Protection, who wanted the NRC to "intrude" in their country to the
extent that was needed to produce a full EIS review. 647 F.2d at 1378.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§2133-2134 (1976).
63. 647 F.2d at 1378 n. 83 (Robinson, J., concurring).
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personnel. The Philippine government produced reports and analyzed the
safety aspects of the proposed nuclear reactor site. They did not hastily
decide to provide nuclear power to the nation, nor did the Philippine
government balk at cooperating with an international agency. This case
still leaves the NRC free to produce an EIS when the foreign government
so requests, when NNPA's Sections 127(a) and 128(a) are not met, or
when the NRC or the courts define and find "unusual circumstances."
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